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Experience and Nature
Wittgenstein Reader of Dewey?
Christiane Chauviré
1 Wittgenstein’s so called ‘later philosophy’ is usually read from the point of view of its
Austro-German sources, which he pointed in 1931 when he drew his intellectual portrait
in Culture and Value : Goethe, Schopenhauer, Spengler, even Weininger, Kraus, Loos have
succeeded to Frege and Russell, Hertz and Boltzmann, who inspired the Tractatus. But,
and it’s a surprise, we read in Dewey’s Experience and Nature (1925) a number of themes
that are well known as Wittgensteinian ones, and which we can find for example in The 
Blue  Book and  in  the  Philosophical  Investigations,  a  fact  neglected  or  ignored  by
Wittgensteinian studies. Experience and Nature devotes a large amount of attention to the
criticisms of the ‘private and exclusive’ character of mental phenomena – a central point
in the Philosophical Investigations.  Like Heidegger,  before Foucault,  but after Nietzsche,
Dewey traces (in order to deconstruct it), a genealogy of Western philosophy and of its
subjectivist, idealistic and moralizing stereotypes: ‘the inner life,’ the Cartesian ‘I,’ the
isolation of the ego, the ‘fantomatic entities’ hypostazised from substantive nouns of our
language, the quest of essences,  the production of theories and of theoretic dualisms
which artificially clive the experience; the adoption of an ‘empiricist and naturalistic’
method should allow us to dismiss them. Like the later Wittgenstein, Dewey admits the
devastating character of his method, which “when it is consistently followed, destroys
many things once cherished; but […] destroys them by revealing their inconsistency with
the nature of things.” As for Wittgenstein and his philosophical method, he speaks of only
crushing “castles in the air” (Investigations, § 118).
2 Everything goes as if Wittgenstein had taken advantage of Experience and Nature,  even
though this reference to pragmatism was underrated in 1920-30 in Cambridge, where
Russell  injustly described it  as ‘the philosophy of American businessmen,’  and where
James’ theory of truth had a bad reputation. True, Wittgenstein confesses the ‘pragmatist’
influence exerted on him by Ramsey and Sraffa in the Preface of his Investigations. But
immediately after having mentioned these two proper names, he adds: “For more than
one reason, what I publish here will have points of contact with what other writers are
writing to-day. If my remarks do not bear a stamp which marks them as mine, – I do not
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wish to lay any further claim to them as my property.” No doubt, from Wittgenstein’s
point of view, pragmatism was not a distinguished philosophy in the sense of Bourdieu (no
more than logical empiricism, which he had snobed at the beginnings of 1930’s),  and
neither  was  American  beviahorism,  two  tendances  of  the  after-War  that  provided
material to his later philosophy. Of course, in this same remark of 1931 where he admits
that he has been influenced by pragmatist ideas, Wittgenstein compares himself to Freud
as “an example of Jewish reproductive thinking”:1 “I think I have never invented a line of
thinking but that it was always provided formeby someone else and I have done no more
than passionately take it up for my work of clarification” (Culture and Value). In many
passages of the Blue Book and of the Investigations, the texture lets the Deweyian under-
text appear.
3 However,  Experience  and  Nature is  in  itself  a  remarkable  philosophical  enterprise,
unfortunately forgotten or underrated; influenced by such different authors as Peirce,
Hegel,  and  Nietzsche,  Dewey  proceeds  to  a  genealogical  deconstruction  of  Western
philosophy – two years before Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit – by means of a method that is
simpler  than  the  (logical)  method  of  dawning  logical  empiricism:  it  consists  in  a
‘naturalistic empiricism,’ or even in a ‘humanist’ empiricism, i. e. in a return to ‘primary
experience,’ which is only what it is (Dewey is here following the Peircian conception of
pure quality as primary entity, which is only what it is). Such a return to experience with
a recall of the ‘natural history’ of man and of his philosophical conceptions are meant to
dismiss the claims and false values of a philosophy born in ‘leisure class’ (Dewey has read
Thornstein Veblen, an author inspired by Peirce and James, and who influenced in turn
Merton, Bourdieu, Elster), which explains perhaps its idealism and subjectivism; Dewey
points  to  an underrating of  appearances  or  of  matter  (a  Nietzschean theme),  which,
according to him, implies a moral judgment. His project is simple: bringing philosophy
back to ordinary life and practice, restoring the continuity between mind and nature in
the sense  of  a  well-understood naturalism,  and in  this  purpose,  always  returning to
‘primary experience’ without falsifying it; the oblivion and falsification of this experience
have given birth to a number of philosophical harms. Dewey regards as ‘mythological’ the
‘natural history of mind’ reflected in the Western conception of the mental. On these
matters,  he  is  inspired  by  Darwin  and  by  his  notion  of  adaptation  which  plays  an
important part in his remarkable theory of perception (“To perceive is to acknowledge
unattained possibilities,” 182) as a forerunner of Gibson’s ‘affordances’ theory – which
dismisses the famous ‘spectator theory of knowledge.’ Our primary experience is not a
cognitive one, or only in a derived way: first, there comes experience, which is as such
ineffable (but not in a mystical sense) and existential; then comes the cognitive stance.
4 Before Wittgenstein, Dewey was asking philosophy to go back to the ordinary: “to apply
to in the more general realm of philosophy the thought which is effective in dealing with
any and every  genuine  question,  from the  elaborate  problems of  science  to  pratical
deliberations of daily life, trivial or momentous” (Preface: viii). Transferred to language,
this idea is echoed in the Investigations, § 116 where Wittgenstein claims: “What we do is
to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use.” Dewey wants to
submit unsolvable philosophical enigmas to the pragmatist test elaborated by Peirce: a
verification  through  results  (intended  as  conceivable  practical  consequences  of  a
conception); he then wants to show that the refuse to consider “primary experience” has
generated those enigmas, along with a lot of abstractions. But Dewey’s empirical method
– as opposed to other kinds of empiricism – is the only one, according to him, that does
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justice to primary experience, as opposed to products of reflection which, being detached
of it, break its original unity: James did point on this phenomenon in his Essays on Radical
Empiricism (1904), when he introduced his distinction between ‘thing’ and ‘thought,’  a
break  that  only  ‘radical’  empiricism allows  to  dismiss,  by  returning  to  a  fluent  and
continuous experience which is prior to the distinction between subjective and objective.
5 Western philosophy wrongly considers the products of reflection as a primary given. In
its  quest for  simple  entities,  it  stripes  off  from  the  continuous  and  fluent  stuff  of
experience  a  set  of  entities  which  are  in  no  way  original:  mathematical  objects,
Platonician  Ideas,  Russellian  sense-data,  objects  of  logical  atomism;  all  of  these  are
products  of  “a  selective  choice”  ending up in the fact  that  objects  are  ‘posited’  and
considered  as  ‘real.’  But  this  choice  goes  unnoticed;  it  is  not  admitted  as  such  by
philosophy which considers the results of this ‘selective valuation’ as real. The problem of
philosophy,  according to Dewey,  is  to know what we should regard as primary or as
original  stuff.  Wittgenstein  will  retain  this  question,  to  which  he  answers  in  his
Investigations: “Look on the language-game as the primary thing” [das Primäre]” (§ 656);
and the given, the Urphänomen which we should accept, amounts to our “forms of life”
(II,  xi,  316), a naturalistic concept referring to an anthropological or even ethological
given. Reading Dewey – if my hypothesis is correct – could only encourage Wittgenstein
to break with the Tractatus’ atomism (which, in Experience and Nature, is perhaps one of
Dewey’s targets along with Russellian acquaintance), and lead him to find the way of an
anthropological naturalism taking into account the “natural history” of man (a concept
which echoes Dewey) and recalling some “very general natural phenomena” constituting
the background [Hintergrund] presupposed [vorausgestzt] by the system of our concepts,
according  to  the  philosophical  grammar  to  which  Wittgenstein  is  now devoted.  The
second chapter of Experience and Nature (“Existence as Precarious and as Stable”), evokes
these original phenomena in which the inquiry originates,  borrowing to some British
anthropologists a description of the origins of humanity, while in a similar way and on
the same subject, Wittgenstein mentions Renan and Frazer in his Remarks on the Golden
Bough and in Culture and value, while he speaks of the awakening of human mind as linked
to striking, even terrifying natural phenomena, describing the same category of facts: a
‘precarious and dangerous’ world with impressive phenomena giving birth to rituals and
superstitions. It is by questioning these origins that we may succeed, according to Dewey,
to restore the primary continuity between nature and mind which Western thought has
artificially  broken.  Similarly,  in  1930,  Wittgenstein describes  after  Renan a  primitive
humanity afraid of  natural  impressive phenomena as  thunder,  birth,  death,  and this
recalls the Dewey’s second chapter: “Existence as Precarious and as Stable.” Even better,
Dewey, before Wittgenstein, makes use of counterfactual sentences about regular facts of
nature: “Unless nature had regular habits, persistent ways, so compacted that they time,
measure and and give rhythm and recurrence to transitive flow, meanings, recognizable
characters,  could  not  be”  (351).  This  idea  is  echoed  in  the  Investigations, where
Wittgenstein points to a correlation between natural regularities and the importance of
some concepts; he invites us to imagine “some general facts of nature” as being different
from what they are, and to draw some consequences of it on the use of some of our
concepts which presuppose these facts: “What we have to mention in order to explain the
significance, I mean the importance, of a concept, are often extremely general facts of
nature:  such  facts  as  are  hardly  ever  mentioned  because  of  their  great  generality”
(§ 143). If these facts were different, “our normal language-games would lose [their] point
[Witz]” (§ 142). The presupposed fact consists in what is contemplated in the antecedent
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of contrefactual sentence. For Dewey as for Wittgenstein, the presupposed facts are often
(physical  or  anthopological)  natural  regularities,  which  impose  conditions  on  our
language-games and on our conceptual scheme. The idea of regularity is central for these
two authors.
6 The return to purely qualitative primary experience (which cannot, nevertheless, afford
to restore the primary naivety, but only a second one) is the simple medicine against the
gaps introduced by philosophy into the continuity of things related in experience, this
fluent stuff which is prior to the distinction between objective and subjective: philosophy
breaks  its  original  unity,  while  it  believes  to  capture  it  by  means  of  such  artificial
theorical  dualisms  as  the  dualism between  matter  and  mind.  Philosophy  must  then
introduce a tertium quid in order to relate that which has been unduely separated (97).
These criticisms are again taken up by Wittgenstein in his lectures in the beginning of
1930’s about such propositional attitudes as expectation and desire: every desire is the
desire-of-a specific-something, and there is no gap to be filled by a tertium quid
introduced,  as  a  philosophical  artefact,  between desire  and the  event  or  object  that
satisfies it. In particular, the separation between the material and the mental leads the
philosopher to “posit” – as Quine would have said – a fantomatic entity, exclusive and
private: the mind, to which he assigns vague and mysterious properties (we can find a
neat echoe of this account in the Blue Book). On the contrary, we should bring the mind
back into nature – without reducing it to nature –, and restore the previous continuity of
primary experience. Then comes the idea to retrace a “natural history of mind” (428), a
project which caught Wittgenstein’s attention: he too wants to reinscribe speaking and
thinking in the “natural history of man” (PI, §§ 25 and 415), in the same way as walking
and eating. What he recalls are not curiosities, but very general facts of nature “which no
one  has  doubted,”  pleads  Wittgenstein,  facts  that  “have  escaped  our  attention  only
because they are always before our eyes” (PI, § 415).
7 Meanings are treated in the same way as mind, and on this point, Dewey’s influence is not
limited to Wittgenstein but also extends to Quine, who was his student (some analogies
that  are  often  pointed  between  Wittgenstein  and  Quine,  especially  regarding  the
mythology of meaning, stem in fact from their common pragmatist source). Meaning is
primarily “a property of behavior” (179),  and as such, meanings can be objective and
universal without necessarily having a psychic existence (181).  It is at this point that
Dewey, who is not an adept of behaviorism, comes closer to it.
8 Man has a tendancy to posit objects (43). For Dewey as later for Quine, entification begins
‘at home’; abstract divisions are actually a set of mental operations wrongly reified and
hypostazised (a point that Wittgenstein also makes in his Investigations, when he criticizes
introspection). In Dewey’s view, mind is so far from being an ethereal and private entity
that it is described as a ‘function of social interactions’; the use of a noun like “mind” is
misleading, and we would better use an adverb like ‘mentally’ or an adjective (a quasi-
grammatical remark, once more taken up by Wittgenstein). To speak of the mind is a way
to speak of especially complex social transactions or interactions. The Self is one of these
‘ultimate  functions  which  emerge  from  organic  and  social  interactions  whose
organization is highly complex.’ This emerging mind is not cut off from nature, but it is a
fulfilment, a termination of nature. Dewey, like Peirce – whose account Dewey is adopting
here – is radically critic towards egotism, towards Cartesian subjectivity and towards the
myths of interiority; he is one of these authors who echo, like James and Wittgenstein,
Lichtenberg’s famous motto: “We should say it thinks, just as we say it lightens.” Already
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for Peirce, the sudden awareness of one’s ego is only the result of failure and error, an
illusion of human vanity, just like ideas of personality and separate mind (actually, the
‘separate selves’ can be fused, as in the case of ‘l’esprit de corps’): Dewey subscribes to this
conception.  As  a  fierce  defender  (just  like  Peirce)  of  the social  character  of  thought
(which is not a private entity and does not necessarily possess a ‘psychical existence’), he
firmly articulates his thesis: “When the introspectionist thinks he has withdrawn into a
wholly private realm of events disparate in kind of other events, made out of mental
stuff, he is only turning his attention to his own soliloquy. And soliloquy is the product
and reflex of  converse with others;  social  communication not  an effect  of  soliloquy”
(170).  This is  similar to the argument we find in §§ 412-3 of the Investigations,  where
Wittgenstein  criticizes  introspection  and  its  philosophical  use.  Dewey  reproaches
psychology with reinforcing this predjudice concerning the private and exclusive ego. In
Wittgenstein’s  view,  introspection only produces  artefacts  of  the stance taken up by
philosophers. According to him, too, the philosophical stance creates its own chimeras.
9 According to an enduring legend, thought is a primary given which words only ‘express,’
without  indicating  any  transition  from  one  to  another:  such  is  the  lesson  which
Wittgenstein  retains  in  his  Blue  Book.  Actually,  thought  is  revealed to  be  one of  the
modalities of social interactions. By inscribing the social in the mental,  Dewey allows
Wittgenstein to develop one of the main themes of his later philosophy, and provides him
with a basis for his argument against a private language and/or the private character of
rule-following. But Wittgenstein imprints to Dewey’s ideas a linguistic or grammatical
turn which the American philosopher did not think of, producing a more sophisticated
argument at the service of his philosophical grammar.
10 As  for  Dewey’s  conception  of  ‘primary  experience,’  it  may  shed  light  on  some  of
Wittgenstein’s obscure sentences which could be explained by reference to Experience and
Nature: “The things of primary experience are so arresting and engrossing that we tend to
accept them just as they are – the flat earth, the march of the sun from east to west ans its
sinking under the earth” (14). As it provides beliefs which seem to go without saying
because of the strength of the habit, primary experience, according to Dewey, seems to
consist inexorably in basic beliefs about environment, obliterated from the very fact of
their  obviousness  and  ubiquity:  these  characteristics  are  also  pointed  out  by
Wittgenstein. PI, § 129 echoes that idea: we tend to forget primary experience and the
striking things which seem to go without saying. Important as they are, those things,
Wittgenstein insists, don’t strike us any more because we are used to them (ibid.): this is
why “the real foundations of his inquiry do not strike a man at all. Unless that fact has at
some time struck him. – And this means: we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most
striking and most powerful.” The result is that we forget an important part of reality, due
to habit and to our ignorance of that which truly interests us. A similar obscure entry of
Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough could be explained, according to us, as an
echo of the beginning of Dewey’s Chapter II: rituals and beliefs “connected with them are
the background out of which philosophy and secular morals slowly developed…” (47); for
Wittgenstein,  too,  this background makes up the substratum of philosophy,  “the real
ground of  our researchers,” that which truly interests us,  being linked with primary
experience; but unfortunately, this foundation is forgotten and escapes us. This explains
that “the aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their
simplicity  and familiarity” and that  the philosophers  must  learn again to see visible
things around them. Similarly, Dewey writes: “the visible is set in the invisible; and in the
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end what is unseen decides what happens in the seen; the tangible rests precariously
upon the untouched and ungrasped” (43-4). Both philosophers agree in deploring this
kind  of  blindness  to  what  goes  without  saying,  and  is  not  remarked.  According  to
Wittgenstein, such blindness is also due to the fact that language puts everything as the
same level, and does not recognize differences between words – a Nietzschean idea –:
against such a prejudice, we must fight in order to make grammatical differences visible
and  avoid  grammatical  confusions.  A  couple  of  Wittgensteinian  texts  from  the
Philosophical  Remarks denounce the fact  that  things which go without  saying and are
immediatly obvious are not considered as the real and important ones: man believes that
the real  is  elsewhere –  in  an “other-worldliness,”  as  Nietzsche would say:  “And one
should want that this obviousness – the life – be something accidental, while that about
which I do not ordinarily bother would be the very reality. Otherwise said, that which we
cannot and doesn’t want to go out in order to see from outside would not be the world” (
Philosophical Remarks, § 47). Wittgenstein thus dismisses both realists and idealists, who
actually live in the only one world. It sounds again like Dewey’s Experience and Nature,
which keeps denouncing the implicit metaphysics shared by realism and idealism.
11 We can also find in the Investigations some echoes of Dewey’s account (after Nietzsche), of
the philosopher’s tendency to underrate in a “moral” sense one member of a pair, for
example phenomena as contrasted with reality, the flow as contrasted with the stable,
unity  as  contrasted with multiplicity.  Wittgenstein also  notices  that  some words  are
blamed for  being  ‘vague,’  while  other  are  congratulated  as  ‘precise.’  And words  are
deeds… In Dewey’s work, this moralization is not primary, but only emerges at the stage
of cognition. Cognitive terms are morally connoted, and also denote artificial entities
derived from primary experience. Contrarily to what is taught by Western philosophy,
cognition does not emerge at the level of primary experience, which is purely existential,
but afterwards,  when objects of  knowledge have been detached from experience and
wrongly posited as real. Such is Dewey’s anti-intellectualism: the cognitive stance is not
primary; it wrongly intellectualizes a purely qualitative and existential experience. More
deeply – and his target seems at this time to be Russell,  his ‘sense-data’  and ‘logical
constructions,’ –Dewey sees in the fact of giving names of physical objects encountered in
experience a ‘complete metaphysical commitment,’ an idea which will have its posterity
in the work of Quine. But empirical ordinary objects have nothing to do with physical
objects: they are ‘mental things,’ and since there is nothing but the mental, the word
‘mental’ is deprived of any oppositional and differential value: if everything is mental,
nothing is mental. We can detect again this refuse to use a word without an antithesis in
Wittgenstein’s  work:  using  a  word  this  way  would  be  to  employ  it  in  a  ‘typically
metaphysical  manner.’  In  the  Blue  Book,  the  Cambridge  philosopher  criticizes  the
misleading  application  of  a  physicalist  grammar  to  the  mental  vocabulary:  by
transferring the grammar of physical objects in the mental field, we introduce ethereal
states and proceedings that duplicate our linguistic performances. But such recourse to
mental  objects  does  not  throw  any  light  on  the  mental,  which  only  a  grammar  of
psychical terms can elucidate. After Peirce, Dewey criticizes the attitude of speaking of a
place where thought proceeds, and Wittgenstein makes of this criticism one of his most
significative problems. The addition of a linguistic and grammatical dimension is the only
thing that distinguishes Wittgenstein from Dewey in several passages.
12 Dewey is, with James, one of the missing links between Peirce and Wittgenstein, whose
resemblances we often pointed in earlier works. Wittgenstein could not avoid mentioning
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and criticizing James,  very popular at  this time;  Dewey is  not as famous as James in
Europe, Wittgenstein does not even nominate him. His ‘reproductive thinking’ has led
him to ‘passionately take up’ Dewey’s ‘line of thought.’ Actually, was he ever done with
pragmatism? Did not he avow, at the end of his life, in On Certainty: “So I am trying to say
something  that  sounds  like  pragmatism.  Here  I  am  being  thwarted  by  a  kind  of
Weltanschauung” (§ 422). Of course, Dewey deserves better than this secret posterity in
Wittgenstein’s work: under modest appearances, Experience and Nature is one of the most
remarkable philosophical enterprises of the twenties, which we may be ranked side by
side with those of Carnap, Husserl, Heidegger, apart from its impact on the author of the
Investigations. Anyway, it will be now known that Dewey’s naturalistic voice, imprinted
with social wisdom and perspicacity, can often be be heard in Wittgenstein’s polyphonic
Investigations.
NOTES
1. This is a perfect example of what historians call the “self-hatred” of Viennese Jews who used to
underrate themselves.
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